Abstract-For achieving optimized spectrum usage, most existing opportunistic spectrum sensing and access protocols model the spectrum sensing and access problem as a partially observed Markov decision process by assuming that the information states and/or the primary users' (PUs) traffic statistics are known a priori to the secondary users (SUs). While theoretically sound, the existing solutions may not be effective in practice due to two main concerns. First, the assumptions are not practical, as before the communication starts, PUs' traffic statistics may not be readily available to the SUs. Second and more serious, existing approaches are extremely vulnerable to malicious jamming attacks. By leveraging the same statistic information and stochastic dynamic decision-making process that the SUs would follow, a cognitive attacker with sensing capability can sense and jam the channels to be accessed by SUs, while not interfering PUs. To address these concerns, we formulate the antijamming, multichannel access problem as a nonstochastic multi-armed bandit problem. By leveraging probabilistically shared information between the sender and the receiver, our proposed protocol enables them to hop to the same set of channels with high probability while gaining resilience to jamming attacks without affecting PUs' activities. We analytically show the convergence of the learning algorithms and derive the performance bound based on regret. We further discuss the problem of tracking the best adaptive strategy and characterize the performance bound based on a new regret. Extensive simulation results show that the probabilistic spectrum sensing and access protocol can overcome the limitation of existing solutions and is highly resilient to various jamming attacks even with jammed acknowledgment (ACK) information.
I. INTRODUCTION
C OGNITIVE radio is an emerging advanced radio technology in wireless access, with many promising benefits, including dynamic spectrum sharing, robust cross-layer adaption, and collaborative networking. Opportunistic spectrum access (OSA), which is at the core of cognitive radio technologies, has recently received increasing attention due to its great potential in improving spectrum utilization efficiency and reliability [2] - [6] . The basic idea of OSA is that individual secondary users (SUs) dynamically search and access the spectrum vacancy to maximize the spectrum utilization while introducing limited interference to the primary users (PUs). In existing literature, the optimality of the channel sensing and access problem has been extensively studied from the single-channel access setting to the multichannel access setting and from perfect sensing to imperfect sensing using various optimization tools. Most of the existing solutions, however, inevitably assumed that traffic statistics are preknown to SUs. In practice, such assumption may not always hold, and more important solutions based on this assumption are vulnerable to malicious jamming attacks. First, the PU's traffic statistics (i.e., initial information states, transition probabilities, and the order of transition probabilities) may not be readily available to the SUs prior to the start of sensing actions. Without a priori information on the traffic patterns, those opportunistic spectrum sensing and access protocols cannot work. Moreover, a cognitive jammer with sensing capabilities can choose channels to sense by leveraging the same statistic information and stochastic dynamic decisionmaking process. Based on the sensing results, the attackers then jam the idle channels potentially used by SUs without affecting activities of PUs. That is because the structure of those sensing policies is fixed and that the channel selection procedure that SUs follow is publicly known. Therefore, a jammer can predict which channels the SUs are going to use in each timeslot and prevent the spectrum from being efficiently utilized.
Traditional antijamming schemes, including both frequencyhopping spread spectrum and direct-sequence spread spectrum [7] , commonly rely on some preshared secrets (i.e., hopping sequences and spreading codes) to achieve jamming-resistant communication. However, they are not directly applicable to cognitive radio networks (CRNs) due to the fact that the presharing of secrets is not applicable in a dynamic SU network since SUs may never meet each other before the start of communication. Recently, uncoordinated frequency hopping (UFH) and uncoordinated direct-sequence spread spectrum (UDSSS) and their variations were proposed to eliminate the reliance on the preshared secrets [8] - [13] . The major problem with UFH and UDSSS is that they are both very expensive. For UFH, it takes a long time for an SU sender to transmit a message to an SU receiver. This is not practical for CRNs where SUs need to finish transmission quickly to yield the channel to PUs. On the other hand, UDSSS may take less time to deliver a message, but the message-decoding process at the receiver side will incur a large cost. Moreover, applying UDSSS directly to the antijamming problem in CRNs results in another problem. UDSSS is commonly used in a broadcast communication setting where the communication channel is publicly known, and SUs are using randomly selected spreading codes to defend against jamming. In CRNs, it will cause large interference to PUs when they are also active on the same communication channel. In [14] and [15] , the problem of defending jamming attacks in CRNs was investigated using game-theoretic approaches. However, they only explored the single-channel case and assumed that the SU receiver can always communicate with the secondary sender (i.e., they are considered as a single player), and sensing is perfect. In [16] , the spectrum sensing problem was formulated under time-varying channels as an adversarial bandit problem. Similar to the work in [14] and [15] , the authors only considered the case of a single sensing channel and assumed that the SU receiver and the SU sender were considered as a single player. In [17] , antijamming games were investigated in CRNs. However, the SU sender and the SU receiver are still considered as a single player, i.e., they are assumed to stay coordinated by initialization with the same random seed.
To address the given limitations, in this paper, we propose a decentralized and robust antijamming multichannel spectrum access protocol for ad hoc CRNs, which can accommodate both the environment dynamics and the strategic behaviors of the jammers. Compared with existing UFH protocols, in a CRN setting, our protocol can adaptively choose the most likely "free" channels with high probability instead of randomly sensing and accessing channels. That is, the transceivers will selectively sense channels with high probability of nonoccupancy by the jammer and the PUs, based on the history information of sensing and access. However, if the SU sender detects the presence of a PU on a sensed channel, it will remain silent and does not access that channel in the current timeslot. The sensing results, together with the immediately following access results, will be fed back to the sensing actions in the future timeslots. Therefore, communication efficiency can be significantly improved without affecting PU's activities. We have shown the robustness of our schemes, even if feedback information is randomly jammed by the adversary. Compared with the preliminary version [1] , in this paper, we have made substantial improvements, including both the theoretical performance analysis and experiments. New experimental results and full proofs of performance bounds are provided. In addition, we also discuss the problem of tracking the best compound (adaptive) strategy and characterize the bounds on the new regret. The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
We propose an online, adaptive, multichannel jammingresistant spectrum access protocol for ad hoc CRNs by formulating the antijamming problem as a nonstochastic multiarmed bandit (NS-MAB) problem. We analytically show the convergence of the learning algorithms as T goes to infinity, i.e., the time-averaged performance difference between the SU sender's and the SU receiver's optimal strategies is no more than (20 k/ √ T ε) √ n ln n, where k = max{k 2 s , k r }; k r and k s are the number of channels the receiver and the sender can simultaneously access in each timeslot, respectively; ε is the probability of sensing; and n is the total number of channels. The proposed algorithm can be efficiently implemented in polynomial time.
We further consider the problem of tracking the best adaptive strategy and present an extension of our construction for antijamming spectrum access. We analyze the performance bound on the new regret defined based on the adaptive optimal strategy. We analytically show that the time-averaged performance difference between the SU sender's and the SU receiver's optimal strategies is upper bounded by O(12k √ n ln n), where k = max{k s , k r }. Since k s , k r , and n are preset system parameters, the performance bound is constant as T goes to infinity. The extended algorithm for tracking the best compound strategy can also be implemented in polynomial time.
We present a thorough quantitative performance characterization of the proposed scheme. The performance is evaluated by analyzing a practical metric-the expected time for message delivery with high probability. We also perform an extensive simulation study to validate our theoretical results. It is shown that the proposed algorithm is efficient and highly effective against various jamming attacks, even with jammed ACK information.
II. MODELS AND ASSUMPTIONS

A. System Model and Assumptions
In a typical CRN, there exist a PU network and an SU network. To facilitate dynamic spectrum access, the spectrum is divided into n channels, each of which evolves independently and has the same total bandwidth. Different from most existing works, in our model, we assume that the channel statistics are not necessarily the same for n channels. In the system, PUs occupy and vacate the spectrum following a discretetime Markov process, where channel i transits from busy state ("0") to idle state ("1") with probability p i 01 and stays in idle state ("1") with probability p i 11 . In the SU network, SUs seek spectrum opportunities among n channels. Specifically, SUs reserve a sensing interval in each timeslot to detect the presence of a PU. Based on the outcomes of sensing, the SU senders decide whether to take the opportunity to access the currently idle channels and vacate the spectrum whenever PUs reclaim them. At the end of a timeslot, the SU receiver sends a short acknowledgement to the SU sender on the channel where a packet transmission is successful.
It is worth noting that we investigate the problem of robust spectrum sensing and access in an ad hoc SU network without a central controller for coordinating the SUs. Therefore, each autonomous SU aims to maximize its own performance by sensing and accessing the spectrum independently [2] . Different from most existing OSA protocols [2] - [6] where traffic statistics are known a priori, we consider a more general and practical scenario where traffic statistics are not available to SUs before the start of communication. For ease of exposition, in the following discussion, we term one pair of communicating SUs as the sender and the receiver. In a multiradio setting, the sender and the receiver are equipped with k s < n and k r < n radios, respectively, enabling them to access multiple channels simultaneously in each timeslot. Since SUs must not interfere with active PUs in each timeslot, an SU sender thus senses k s < n and accesses only k a ≤ k s channels sequentially. At the receiver side, various efficient message verification schemes can be used for packet verification to defend against pollution attacks, and fragments that have passed integrity checks are reassembled to reconstruct the original message. To relax the strict synchronization between the sender and the receiver, we can let the hopping frequency of the receiver be much slower than the hopping frequency of the sender, so packet losses caused by the lack of synchronization between the sender and the receiver can be neglected. Note that in our model, we do not consider node authentication and message privacy, which are orthogonal to the security problems this work addresses.
B. Threat Model and Assumptions
In CRNs, PUs such as TV users are licensed users (i.e., being protected by law) and usually well physically protected. From the jammer's perspective, it is very difficult to launch effective attacks, and there will be heavy penalties on the attackers if detected [18] . Therefore, we assume that the jammer does not have high incentive to attack PUs and risk itself in jamming the licensed bands when PUs are active. Instead, the jammer's target is on the SUs, who are unlicensed users and permitted to access the spectrum only when not interfering with PUs. The SUs' access to the spectrum is opportunistic in nature, without clear legal protection. Moreover, SU networks are usually dynamic ad hoc networks formed by randomly deployed self-organizing wireless devices, where it is difficult to implement effective security countermeasures. A stealthy attacker can choose to jam any targeted SUs and prevent the targets from using the spectrum for communication. Note that such attacks against SUs by the jammer are stealthy and do not affect PUs' communications. That is, the attacker utilizes the same sensing interval to detect (sense) the activity of the PUs and jam only the idle channels (which are potentially used by SUs), based on the sensing outcomes.
We assume that the jammer has similar radio capabilities as SUs. That is, in each timeslot, the jammer is capable of sensing and jamming k j (k j < n) channels simultaneously. Assuming that the jammer knows the whole spectrum access protocol, the objective, then, is to prevent the spectrum from being efficiently utilized by the legitimate SUs. Specifically, we consider four types of jammers with different jamming strategies.
Static Jammer: A static jammer is an oblivious attacker, who selects the same set of channels in each timeslot to sense. Based on the sensing results, he emits jamming signals on the sensed idle channels. Note that the jamming action is made independent of the sensing history the jammer may have observed in the past.
Random Jammer: A random jammer is also an oblivious attacker who selects a set of channels uniformly at random from the public set of n channels in each timeslot to sense. Based on the sensing results, he emits jamming signals on the sensed idle channels. Similar to the static jammer, the jamming action is made independent of the sensing history the random jammer may have observed in the past.
Myopic Jammer: A myopic jammer is a powerful cognitive attacker running the myopic algorithm, which is a wellknown OSA strategy and can achieve suboptimal performance. (The principle of myopic policy will be explained later in Section III.) Initially, the jammer selects k j channels to sense in each timeslot until all the n channels have been sufficiently sensed. Then, the jammer can make an accurate estimation of the traffic statistics using the sensing results, based on which the jammer utilizes the myopic policy to predict PUs' channel occupancy pattern and emits jamming signals on the most likely idle channels. Obviously, in each timeslot, the jamming strategy is selected based on the sensing history and preknown channel occupancy statistics.
Adaptive Jammer: An adaptive jammer is also a cognitive attacker who runs a multiarmed bandit (MAB) algorithm, which is an online learning protocol. (The MAB-based learning protocol is explained in Section IV.) The jammer selects k j channels to sense in each timeslot and jams the sensed idle channels based on sensing history and past observations. Note that, in the power adaptive jamming attack model, we assume that the jammer can adjust the sensing and jamming strategies by leveraging the outcomes of jamming. In other words, we assume that the jammer knows whether the jamming is successful in transmitting channels (where both the sender and the receiver reside in a timeslot) for all the past timeslots. We emphasize that it is almost impossible to implement such a powerful jammer in practice. However, for the purpose of performance comparison, we show that SUs equipped with our antijamming spectrum sensing and access protocol are still resilient to such adaptive jamming attacks. Table I summarizes the notations used throughout this paper.
III. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS OF MULTICHANNEL OSA PROTOCOLS
Here, we analyze the weakness of the existing multichannel OSA protocols under jamming attacks. For ease of illustration, in the following, we consider an SU network with a single sender-receiver pair, but the same ideas can also be applied and extended to a multiuser setting.
A. OSA With Known Channel Traffic Statistics
In the context of cognitive radio for OSA, a single-channel access problem within the framework of a partially observed Markov decision process was investigated, and myopic policies under both perfect and imperfect sensing cases have been investigated in [2] - [6] . The main idea of these schemes is that the sender chooses a subset of n channels to sense, based on its past observations, and gains a fixed reward if a channel is sensed idle. The objective of the sender is to then maximize the rewards that it can gain over a (potentially infinite) number of timeslots. It has been shown that this optimization problem can be solved by a stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) approach to obtain optimal performance. To reduce the computation complexity of SDP caused by the expensive backward induction procedure, many research studies have been focused on index policies, and a myopic policy that maximizes the conditional expected reward acquired at t, which was first proposed and explored in [2] and [3] . By concentrating only on the present and completely ignoring the future, myopic approaches achieve suboptimal performance in general. In myopic policy, it has also been shown that a sufficient statistic or the information state of the system for the optimal decision-making is the belief vector
, where ω i (t) is the conditional probability that channel i is idle in timeslot t. In timeslot t, a sensing action a(t) denotes the k s channels to be sensed. Let K i (t) ∈ {0, 1} denote whether an ACK on channel i is received in timeslot t. Given a(t) and K i (t), the belief state in timeslot t + 1 is given by [2] 
Assuming that all channels have the same transmission rate B i , the myopic policy under Ω is defined asâ(t) = arg max a(t) i∈a(t) ω i (t)B i . Recently, the dynamic multichannel access problem was studied under a special class of restless multiarmed bandit problems (RMBPs) in [6] , based on which an index policy called Whittle's index policy has also been applied in the dynamic spectrum access. Similar to myopic policy, the proposed Whittle's index policy enables the SU sender to choose those channels whose current states have the largest indexes to sense and access. However, a strict constraint that requires activating exact m = k s arms/channels at each time step may cause optimality to be lost, but even so, Whittle's index policy has near-optimal performance. Another interesting observation is that Whittle's index policy has the same structure as the myopic policy when channels are stochastically identical.
B. Analysis of OSA Under Malicious Jamming Attacks
Although theoretically sound, almost all the existing OSA protocols (including index-based policies) work well only in nonmalicious environments. Among others, one key assumption made by the existing solutions is that the traffic statistics should be known a priori. Taking index-based policies for example, they require that the initial belief vectors Ω(0) and the order of state transition probabilities (i.e., p i 01 is greater or less than p i 11 ) on all channels are preknown to SUs. In practice, however, these statistics may not be readily available [5] . More important due to the deterministic nature of the channel/ frequency selection procedure, those OSA protocols are vulnerable to malicious jamming attacks. That is, an intelligent jammer, who knows the traffic statistics of all channels or learns them through sensing and estimation by observing all channels, can leverage such information to predict which channel to use. Since the index policies always choose the first k s channels with the largest indexes for sensing and accessing, the jammer can use the same dynamic decision process to perform effective jamming attacks. In the worst case, the communication can be completely jammed as the jammer maintains the same updates information for channel "index" as SUs in each timeslot. From a theoretical perspective, most of OSA protocols are formulated as optimization problems with deterministic solutions. For example, the index policies are established based on the stochastic model of the channel statistics. Consider Whittle's index policy developed under the RMBPs [19] . Because the evolvement of information state (belief vector) is known, the players (the sender and the receiver) can compute ahead of time exactly what payoffs (rewards) will be received from each arm (channel). Based on the given analysis, it is necessary and important to develop probabilistic OSA protocols that are resistant to various jamming attacks and can accommodate the special characteristics of CRNs.
To enhance the robustness of OSA, the problem of defending jamming attacks in CRNs was investigated using gametheoretic approaches [14] , [15] . However, they only explored the single-channel case and assumed that the SU receiver can always communicate with the secondary sender (i.e., they are considered as a single player) and that sensing is perfect. In [16] , the spectrum sensing problem was formulated under timevarying channels as an adversarial bandit problem. Similar to the work in [14] and [15] , the authors only considered the case of a single sensing channel and assumed that the SU receiver and the SU sender were considered as a single player. In this paper, we consider a more practical model and take a step toward the development of robust multiradio multichannel OSA protocols for CRNs.
IV. JAMMING-RESISTANT MULTIRADIO MULTICHANNEL OSA
A. Scheme Overview
Based on the given analysis, we can see that when an attacker launches malicious jamming attacks to disrupt legitimate communications in SU networks, the channel statistics (which are determined by activities of PUs when no jamming exists) cannot correctly reflect the true state (idle or busy) of the channel. That is, the rewards (i.e., indications of successful packet receptions) associated with each channel cannot be modeled by a stationary distribution, or no statistical assumptions can be made about the transition of information state and the generation of rewards. This is due to the dynamic behaviors of both PUs and jammers, i.e., PUs occasionally occupy and free the channels, and a jammer may adjust the sensing and jamming strategy to maximize the effect of jamming. These effects will make the generation of rewards arbitrarily change on channels in each timeslot. Motivated by this observation, it is necessary to keep an exploration of the best possible set of channels for transmission to adapt the dynamics of jammers and PUs. Meanwhile, it is also necessary to exploit the previously chosen favorable set of channels because too much exploration will potentially underutilize them. Obviously, the proposed antijamming problem is the one balancing between exploitation and exploration, rather than only optimizations.
B. Problem Formulation: A Multiplayer Game
In this paper, we consider a jamming and antijamming game among an SU sender, an SU receiver, and a jammer under dynamic PU behaviors. To fully utilize the vacant spectrum, the objective of the SU sender-receiver is to choose the sensing, access/receiving actions in each timeslot to maximize the total expected rewards (i.e., successfully received packets) over T timeslots. On the contrary, the jammer's objective is to minimize the total expected rewards to disrupt the legitimate SU communications. Since channel states (idle or busy) are not directly observable before channel sensing, the sender chooses k s channels to sense during the sensing interval, where the sensing action is made based on all the past decisions and observations. Due to PUs' dynamic actions on a channel, the sender chooses only k a (k a ≤ k s ) idle channels to access. At the receiver side, the receiver independently chooses k r channels to receive, where the selection is also made based on all the past decisions and observations. During the same timeslot, the jammer chooses k j channels to sense and jam the sensed idle channels based on the chosen jamming strategy.
Note that, although we consider a single SU pair in our antijamming problem, the proposed scheme can be directly applied to an SU communication network with multiple SU sender-receiver pairs. This is because each SU, which is autonomous in an ad hoc SU network, can utilize our proposed scheme to maximize its own performance by taking interference/collisions caused by other SU pairs as jamming signals. It is easy to see that when the number of other SU pairs in the neighborhood of the receiver that use the same channels is much less than n, the impact of unintentional interference can be negligible.
Next, we formalize the jamming and antijamming game using mathematical notation. First, we number the channels/ frequencies from 1 to n and construct the vector space {0, 1} n . Obviously, the sender's sensing and access strategy space and the receiver's receiving strategy space are denoted as S s ⊆ {0, 1} n of size
, respectively. In an SU's strategy/vector, the value of the f th (f ∈ {1, . . . , n}) entry of a vector is 1, if the f th channel is chosen for sending and access or receiving; 0, otherwise. Accordingly, the jamming strategy space for the jammer is denoted as
Different from an SU's strategy, the value of 0 in the f th entry denotes that the jammer chooses the f th channel to sense and jam, and the value is 1, otherwise. Different from the above three parties, PUs' activities on the channels are independent of other parties' actions, and a PU's action/strategy can also be denoted as a vector s p ∈ {0, 1} n , where the value 1 denotes the channel is idle, and the value 0 denotes the channel is occupied.
During each timeslot, the sender, the receiver, and the jammer choose their own respective strategies s s ∈ S s , s r ∈ S r , and s j ∈ S j , respectively. In each timeslot, assume that the PU's strategy or activity is s p . From the receiver's perspective, s s ∧ s p ∧ s j can be considered as a joint decision made by the sender, the PU, and the jammer, where ∧ denotes bitwise AND operation. We say that in timeslot t the sender, a reward g f,t = 1 is introduced for channel f if the f th entry of s s ∧ s p ∧ s j is 1; otherwise, no reward is received, i.e., g f,t = 0. On the receiver side, the reception of a reward depends on the state of the channel f the receiver has chosen for packet reception. In addition, we use erasure coding combined with short signatures to verify/authenticate the received packets, reassemble message, and defend against pollution-based denialof-service attacks [9] . Note that we do not differentiate between packet jamming and packet collisions because they both cause interference to the legitimate packets, and packet coding can be used to recover bit errors in received packets.
After the receiver chooses a strategy s r , a reward on channel f is revealed to the receiver if, and only if, f is chosen as a receiving channel. There are four possible cases.
Case 1) No packet is received on f . This is because f has not been selected by the sender for transmission. In this case, reward 0 is obtained. Case 2) A packet is received on f . If the received packet fails to pass the verification, reward 0 is obtained. Case 3) A packet is received on f . Jammed or collided packets that cannot be recovered will be discarded, resulting in 0 reward. Case 4) A packet is received on f . If no jamming is detected or corrupted packets due to jamming can be recovered via packet coding, a reward 1 is obtained.
Similarly, after the sender chooses a strategy s s , a reward on channel f is revealed to the sender if, and only if, f is chosen as a sending channel. A reward 1 is obtained if an ACK is received on f ; otherwise, the reward is 0. Note that for packet reception, real experiments have shown in [20] that by looking at the received signal strength during bit reception, accurate differentiation of packet errors caused by jamming and those caused by weak links can be realized. Since our work is focused on the defense against jamming attacks, we consider packet errors are due to jamming.
In this paper, we formally formulate the jamming-resistant spectrum sensing and access problem as an NS-MAB problem [21] - [23] , where each channel can be considered as an arm of an multiarm bandit. Due to the jamming effect and dynamic behaviors of PUs, each channel f is then associated with an arbitrary and unknown sequence of rewards, which can be obtained on a channel if the sender and the receiver choose f for sending and receiving simultaneously.
For ease of analysis and presentation, we first define some important notation. In each timeslot t ∈ {1, . . . , T }, the sender (receiver) independently selects a strategy I t from his strategy sets. We write f ∈ i if channel f is chosen in strategy i, i.e., the value of the f th entry of i is 1. Note that one strategy is a vector of dimension n, I t denotes a particular strategy chosen for timeslot t, and i denotes a general strategy in the strategy set. The total rewards of a strategy i during timeslot t is g i,t = f ∈i g f,t , and the cumulative rewards up to timeslot t of each strategy i is
The total rewards over all chosen strategies up to timeslot t is thus
, where I s is randomly chosen according to a certain distribution over the strategy set. To quantify the performance, we use the following metric called regret:
where the superscript is used to differentiate the sender from the receiver, and the maximum is taken over all strategies available to the sender or the receiver. The regret is defined as the accumulated rewards (or successfully received packets) difference over T timeslots between the proposed strategy and the optimal static strategy. The static optimal strategy denotes the best fixed solution (i.e., the best set of channels that if kept in use, the largest rewards will be generated) for message reception in the presence of jamming. Note that the sender and the receiver will adaptively choose their own strategies in each timeslot based on the updated probability distributions over the strategy set. As for the sender (receiver), the updates of the probability distribution are determined by the outcomes of joint actions of the PU, the jammer, and the receiver (sender). Thus, the accumulated rewards of the sender (receiver) along the time depend on the actions of the other three parties in each timeslot.
C. Our Construction
Here, we present our jamming-resistant spectrum sensing and access protocol. Our algorithm is a probabilistic one that can accommodate the changes of channel status caused by a (potentially) malicious jammer. The dynamic property of the proposed solution lies in the trade-off between exploration action and exploitation action, which will both affect the system performance.
Algorithm 1 A Jamming-Resistant Multiradio Multichannel Spectrum Sensing and Access Protocol. following (1) and (2), respectively. Update the total strategy weight as W
As shown in Algorithm 1, the algorithm comprises two subalgorithms: A s at the sender side and A r at the receiver side. In Algorithm 1, the system parameters β, γ, and η are determined by the regret bound, and the derivation of them will be shown in the proof of Theorem 1.
Let N x (x ∈ {s, r}) denote the total number of strategies. Each strategy is assigned a strategy weight, and each channel is assigned a channel weight. During each timeslot, the channel weight is dynamically adjusted based on the virtual channel rewards revealed to the sender and the receiver, i.e.,
We use exponentially weighted forecasters that follow Exp3 ("Exponential-weight algorithm for Exploration and Exploitation") first proposed in [21] . In a multiarmed bandit setting, at time t, an expert is chosen with probability that increases with the past performance of the expert. In practice, the most popular choice of such kind of function is an exponential function. It is easy to see that the increase of the virtual channel rewards leads to larger channel weights. A strategy indicates the choices of channels for use, so we define the weight of a strategy as the product of the weights of all channels, i.e.,
where g 
where q x f,t (x ∈ {s, t}) denotes the channel f 's probability distribution, and R t is a random variable under Bernoulli distribution that satisfies P{R t = 1} = ε. The parameter β is a fixed value that will be determined before the execution of the protocol (see the proof of Theorem 1). Based on the true rewards revealed to the sender and the receiver, we define the virtual rewards to increase the weight of "good" channels, i.e., increase the access probabilities of "good" channels that have been less often sensed.
In Algorithm 1, at the beginning of each timeslot, the transceiver chooses a strategy based on the probability distribution p
where x ∈ {s, r}. The parameter γ x is used to balance between w x . In the calculation of the strategy probability distribution, the first part is a distribution that assigns to each action a probability mass exponential in the estimated cumulative reward for that action, and the second part is the uniform distribution. If not mixed with the uniform distribution, the algorithm might have large deviations with high probability, i.e., from time to time, it may concentrate on the wrong strategy for too long and then incur a large regret. Hence, the mixing is done to make sure that the algorithm tries out all strategies and gets good estimates of the gains for each channel [21] . Note that γ x is a fixed value that will be determined before the execution of the protocol (see the proof of Theorem 1). The covering strategy set C x is defined to ensure that each channel/frequency is sampled sufficiently often. The covering set has the property that for each channel f , there is a strategy i in the covering set such that f ∈ i. Based on the definition of strategy, each strategy includes k x (x ∈ {s, r}) "active" channels. Thus, we can construct one typical and simple covering set with size |C x | = n/k s (x ∈ {s, r}). Discussions: In practice, the transceiver (i.e., the sender and the receiver) may not have the same sensing outcomes due to sensing errors. Hence, in our design, we let the sender perform sensing in each timeslot, and the receiver only selects channels to listen on. Note that the operating point of the spectrum sensor is set as the probability of the collision with PUs [2] , which includes two types of sensing errors: f alse alarm probability and miss detection probability. Without loss of generality, we use τ to denote the sensing error probability in the following analysis, where τ = P{f alse alarm}(1 − P{P U active}) + P{miss detection}P{P U active}.
To eliminate the information asymmetry between the sender and the receiver, the sender uses the ACK information to update the probability distribution over the strategy set. Thus, the accumulated rewards for the sender and the receiver are equivalent, i.e., G s t = G r t . (Note that we make this assumption to obtain the upper bound performance of the proposed antijamming scheme. In Section VI, we evaluate the case where ACKs are randomly jammed by the attacker, showing the strong resilience of our proposed scheme.) In addition, because the sender and the receiver are not perfectly synchronized, it is necessary and important to evaluate how close the sender's and the receiver's strategies are as time goes. Since the closer the transceivers' chosen strategies are, the more rewards generated. This is equivalent to saying how well the learning-based algorithm proceeds to maximize the system throughput.
Spectrum sensing usually consumes more energy compared with reception, i.e., it is costly to obtain the sensing results [24] . In certain application scenarios, legitimate nodes may have only a limited number of sensing times due to the energy constraint. Let ε denote the proportion of timeslots when sensing is performed. For T timeslots, the number of sensing times is approximately T ε. In Algorithm 1, we introduce a Bernoulli random variable with P{R t = 1} = ε at the sender side. Thus, the sender senses the channel with probability ε. There are two possible cases when the sender does not perform sensing in a timeslot. In the first case, the sender remains silent in this timeslot, without transmitting any packets. Due to the random sensing and access strategy, it is hard for the adversary to predict the behaviors of the sender. However, as no packets are transmitted, the transmission delay may be increased. In the second case, the sender still accesses the most possibly free channels based on the previous probability distribution. In this case, there is a trade-off between the collision probability with PUs and the number of sensing times.
D. Theoretical Analysis Definition 1:
An algorithm A is α-static (or α-adaptive) approximation of the static (or adaptive) optimal solution if and only if it can transmit the message successfully in time αT with high probability (w.h.p.) 1 − (1/l ) when the static (or adaptive) optimal solution can transmit the same message successfully with the same probability 1 − (1/l ) in time T , where > 0 is a constant, and l is the number of packets in the message.
Definition 2: The regret of an algorithm A is the difference between the accumulated rewards using the static optimal strategy and those using A over T timeslots, i.e., G
. The first definition is used to characterize the approximation ratio between the proposed algorithm and the static and adaptive optimal solutions. The second definition is used to characterize the throughput performance between the proposed algorithm and the optimal solution. In the following analysis, we will write G max instead of G max T whenever the value of T is clear from the context. In addition, we will write G max T (s) and G max T (r) to denote the rewards of the static optimal strategies for the sender and the receiver, respectively.
Due to the probabilistic strategy selection, the sender and the receiver are not perfectly synchronized in each timeslot. However, we show that the sender's sensing strategy and the receiver's receiving strategy will converge to their own optimal strategies. The following theorem measures how close their optimal strategies are as T → ∞.
Theorem 1:
Due to the page limitation, please refer to our technical report [25] for the detailed proof.
Theorem 2: Algorithm 1 has time complexity O(k x nT ) and space complexity O(k x n), where x ∈ {s, r}.
Proof: See Appendix A. In practice, the transmitted messages, which may have much larger size than the length of timeslots, have to be split into small fragments to fit the timeslots. As previously shown, the proposed jamming-resistant spectrum sensing and access protocol is probabilistic in nature; hence, we cannot guarantee that the transmitted message is delivered in a certain number of timeslots with probability 1. Hence, to evaluate the transmission efficiency, we consider the expected time for a message delivery with high probability, which implies that the probability goes to 1 when the total number of packets goes to infinity. Based on the acknowledgement information, in each timeslot, the sender will pick up a packet that has not been delivered. Without loss of generality, assuming a message M is partitioned into l packets
. Then, the transmitted message M can be reconstructed at the receiver if and only if all l packets are successfully received. The following theorems characterize the approximation factors for the static optimal and adaptive optimal solutions. Theorem 3: When l ≥ 36(1 + c )k r n ln n/(c − 1) 2 2 , our algorithm is (1+c )-static approximation for any constant c> 1.
Proof: See [1] .
is the probability of sensing a channel, and τ is the sensing error probability.
Proof: See [1] . Discussions: As can be seen in the proof of Theorem 1, the parameters β, η, and γ are fixed values, and they are all precomputed before the protocol execution. If we aim at ensuring that with probability of at least 1 − δ the regret bound can be achieved, we can set a preferable value for δ. The parameter selection process is as follows. We have β x = (k x /nT ) ln(n/δ), γ x = 2η x n, and η x = ln n/4T n. Here, n and k r are preselected system parameters. Once T is obtained, the specific values of β x , η x , and γ x can be determined such that the regret bound holds (or asymptotic optimality is achieved). To determine T , in our protocol design, we let the sender determine a feasible T and encode it in each packet for transmission. The receiver obtains T by successfully decoding any received packet and begins to run the algorithm. Assuming that p is the probability of message delivery, the sender determines T by first estimating a lower bound k r of k r and an upper bound k j of k j . It then calculates such that 1−(1/l )= p and determines the constant c > 1 such that l = 36(1 + c )k r n ln n/(c − 1) 2 2 . Finally, the expected time for message
By theorem 3, with probability of at least p, the message M can be successfully recovered at the receiver.
V. TRACKING THE ADAPTIVE COMPOUND STRATEGY FOR ANTIJAMMING SPECTRUM ACCESS
In the given discussions, regret is computed as the accumulated reward difference between the proposed antijamming strategy and the static optimal strategy. We have shown that the proposed jamming-resistant spectrum sensing and access protocol in Algorithm 1 can track the static optimal strategy and converge to it as time goes. According to the definition, the static optimal strategy is selected as the fixed "best" strategy used for all timeslots. However, for each timeslot, there always exists the best strategy against the "joint" strategy of the other parties involved in the antijamming game. Linking these strategies from all timeslots together, the best compound strategy is formulated, which is the so-called adaptive optimal strategy. Hence, an interesting question can be raised at each timeslot where the good strategy may change, is it possible to select a sequence of strategies to approximate the adaptive/compound strategy?
A. Proposed Construction
In Algorithm 1, the size of the static optimal strategy set is
). However, for all possible compound strategies, the strategy set is extremely large, i.e., with size approximately as large as
. Therefore, by using the previous protocol, it is computationally expensive to track the best compound (adaptive) strategy. Here, we will consider an extension of the antijamming protocol by using the tracking the best expert problem and develop an efficient algorithm to approximate the best compound strategy.
Different from the static optimal strategy, the best compound strategy is allowed to change its strategy m times in T timeslots, i.e., a strategy from
) is assigned in a timeslot. Consider the compound strategy i = (i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i m ) corresponding to the timeslot vector t = (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t m ), strategy i j is used to predict the best strategy at time instant t j ≤ t ≤ t j+1 . Then, the new regret is defined as
where max (i,t) G i,T denotes the accumulated rewards obtained by using the adaptive compound strategy with respect to (i, t).
For ease of analysis, we assume ε = 1, i.e., the sender performs sensing in each timeslot. The new algorithm for tracking the adaptive compound strategy differs from Algorithm 1 in step 6. For ease of notation, we eliminate the superscript x in the following expressions. In step 6, the sender and the receiver both update the strategy weight as
where
, and W t is the sum of the total weights, i.e.,
B. Fast Implementation of the Proposed Construction
As can be seen, the time complexity of the proposed construction for tracking the adaptive compound strategy is O(n k s T ). Here, we present an alternative method of implementing the given algorithm in O(k s nT 2 ) time. The basic idea of our fast implementation is to select channels one by one in each timeslot/round, instead of computing each strategy from a large strategy set. We let S(f, k) denote the strategy set in which each strategy chooses k channels from channels f , f + 1, . . . , n, and S(f , k) denote the strategy set in which each strategy chooses f channels from channel 1, 2, . . . , f . In addition, we let G t ,t−1 (f ) denote the sum of cumulative gains in the interval S(f , k) . Formally, we have
Correspondingly, we have the following properties:
At timeslot t, for any t ∈ [1, t − 1], if k < k s channels have been chosen from channels 1, . . . , f − 1, we choose channel f with probability
If t = t, all channels are chosen with the same probability 1/nN. Note that t is chosen before the computation of (12) according to the following distribution:
, and Z t,t−1 = N . Here, W t can be efficiently computed as follows:
Note that
Instead of maintaining the weight of each strategy w i,t , we compute the probability q f,t for each channel as follows:
Algorithm 2 shows a complete description of the fast implementation algorithm. It is easy to see that, when calculating (10) and (11) (10) and (11) (10) and (11), respectively. 6: Update W t following (14) . End
We next show the correctness of Algorithm 2. Let G (f ) = G t ,t−1 (f ) and c(f ) = 1, if channel f is chosen in strategy i; otherwise, G (f ) = c(f ) = 0. Then, the number of channels chosen among channels 1, 2, . . . , f is denoted by
It is obvious that the virtual reward of strategy i is G t ,t−1 (i) = n f =1 G (f ). Therefore, the probability that a strategy i is chosen for any t ∈ [1, Moreover, if t = t, the probability to choose strategy i is 1/N . Thus, according to the conditional probability formula and (13) and (16), we can derive the probability to choose strategy i as w i,t−1 /W t−1 , which is exactly the same as the original algorithm shown in Section V-A. Therefore, this fast implementation and the original algorithm are equivalent in the sense that the prediction sequences of strategies have the same distribution. Finally, we have the following theorem to characterize the performance bound on the new regret defined in (6) , which measures the difference between the proposed algorithm and the adaptive optimal compound strategy.
Theorem 5: For the new algorithm that tracks the best compound strategy, the normalized reward distance
Proof: Following the same proof strategy in Theorem 1 and with a slight modification of proof of tracking the best expert in [23] , we can show that at the receiver side, with probability 1 − δ, the regret for the compound strategy G
Using the facts |C| = n/k r and N ≤ n k r , we prove that when T → ∞, the regret for the compound strategy is, at most, 6k r √ T 2 n ln n, by properly choosing k r , n, and δ. Similarly, we obtain the bound 6k s √ T 2 n ln n at the sender side. Finally, as G
In comparison to the regret bound obtained by using the static optimal strategy, the proposed algorithm cannot guarantee that the normalized reward distance converges to 0 when tracking the best compound strategy. This is because the best strategy may always change in each timeslot, and it is hard for the decision maker to adapt his choices to the adaptive optimal strategy. However, Theorem 5 guarantees that the reward distance between the sender and the receiver is, at most, O(12k √ n ln n) when T goes to infinity. In practice, k and n are preset system parameters, so the reward difference between two transceivers can achieve constant performance.
VI. NUMERICAL AND SIMULATION RESULTS
In our simulation, we assume that both the sender and the receiver use the proposed probabilistic antijamming protocol, i.e., MAB-based online channel selection strategy. Meanwhile, the PU dynamically accesses the whole spectrum with p
The jammer, however, chooses his jamming strategy from static jamming, random jamming, myopic jamming, and adaptive jamming (i.e., MAB-based jamming). For ease of illustration, we let a four-element tuple denote the four parties' respective strategies. For example, "mab sta dyn mab" is used to denote the simulation setting that the sender uses the MAB-based strategy, the jammer uses the static jamming strategy, the PU dynamically uses the spectrum according to certain traffic statistics, and the receiver uses the MAB-based strategy. Without loss of generality, we assume k s = k r = 3, under which we vary the jammer's jamming capabilities and the total number of channels in the simulation.
A. Message Delivery Performance Evaluation
We first evaluate the performance of Algorithm 1. Fig. 1  shows 1 ) the average number of delivered packets as a function of T and 2) the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the expected time to achieve message delivery when l = 10, k j = 3, n = 8, and p 11 i > p 01 i . Fig. 1(a), (c) , (e), and (g) shows that the performances of static opt and adaptive opt remain nearly the same, particularly when the jammer uses the static jamming Fig. 2 . Effects of sensing error probability τ on the system performance. Fig. 3 . Comparisons of the different jamming strategies on the system performance. Fig. 4 . Effects of sensing probability ε and jamming capability k j on the system performance under "mab myo dyn mab." strategy. This implies the PU's dynamics incur relatively "static" channel status from the perspective of SUs. Hence, we cannot gain much more by using the adaptive opt than the static opt. We also compare the effect of different jamming strategies on the throughput performance in Fig. 3 . In Fig. 3(a) , it is shown that when static, random, or MAB-based jamming strategies are adopted and the number of packets to be transmitted is relatively small, the whole message can be delivered with high probabilities before T = 150. As for the myopic jamming attack, it takes T = 250 for the receiver to recover the whole message with high probability. However, as shown in Fig. 3(b) , if T continues to increase to 150 timeslots, the adaptive jammer incurs nearly the same performance deterioration as the myopic jammer. Among others, the key reason why the myopic jammer and the adaptive jammer are the most effective jammers is that they can make use of traffic statistics and/or acknowledgement information to dynamically adjust their jamming strategies. Fig. 4(a) and (b) shows how the sensing probability ε and the jamming capability k j affect the performance, respectively. Not surprisingly, the increase of k j will lead to fewer delivered Fig. 5 . Effects of n and l on the system performance with respect to the cdf of the expected time to achieve message delivery.
packets, and a larger sensing probability will enable the sender to update the strategy distributions using the sensing outcomes. In Fig. 2 , we evaluate how the sensing error probability τ affects the system performance. It has been shown that under static jamming or random jamming attacks, the average number of cumulative delivered packets decreases when τ increases. Interestingly, if adaptive jamming and myopic jamming attacks are launched, the system performance is first improved as τ increases and then deteriorates when τ reaches a certain threshold. This is because a smaller τ can help disrupt the predictions of the two types of intelligent jammers on the available channels. If the sensing error probability τ continues to increase, sensing errors begin to dominate the performance and cause a performance deterioration. In Figs. 5 and 6, we use the setting "mab myo dyn mab" as an example to show how parameters n and l affect the system performance. Fig. 5 shows that when l increases (i.e., from 10 to 30), the expected time to receive the message w.h.p. increases correspondingly. On the other hand, different values of n will also affect performance as T increases. For example, see the circle point in Figs. 5 and 6(a). When T < 180, the case of n = 8 gives the best performance; after T > 180, the case of n = 10 outperforms that of n = 8; when the time reaches T = 240, the case of n = 14 outperforms the case of n = 8, and it gives the best performance after T = 320. This means that it is better to choose a small n when the message size is short; a larger n is preferred when the message size is relatively large. However, it does not imply that the larger n will always give the best performance. As shown in Fig. 6(b) , when n increases from 12 to 14, the performance gain is very small, and when n further increases to n = 16, the performance deteriorates. This is because the use of a large n also makes it difficult for the sender and the receiver to hop to the same set of channels.
We then evaluate the performance of Algorithm 2. In Fig. 7(a)-(d) , we show the impact of parameter m on the system performance. Let m s , m r denote the number of times to change the strategy in T timeslots for the sender and the receiver, respectively. As expected, the larger m s will help improve the system performance, which indicates that the transceiver requires more time to learn to choose good channels. The selection of a new strategy will contribute to the update of system parameters so that available channels are chosen with a higher probability. However, when m s = 1500, the larger m r will lead to less number of received packets, and it requires more time to deliver the message with high probability. This is because it is difficult for the sender and the receiver to hop on the same channels when both parties choose new channels too frequently.
We also evaluate the system performance when the jammer randomly jams the ACK information. In practice, this is the best strategy the jammer can adopt to disrupt the strategy convergence between the sender and the receiver. In Fig. 8 , we can see that when ACKs get jammed, the number of successfully received packets will decrease, and it requires more time to deliver the whole message. However, it also indicates that our proposed antijamming spectrum sensing and access protocol can still defend against such a powerful jammer.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have identified the vulnerability of the existing OSA protocols under malicious jamming attacks. Motivated by this observation, we designed efficient and robust online OSA algorithms and analytically showed the regret bounds and approximation ratios of our methods with respect to optimal strategies. Our extensive simulations validate the theoretical analysis, showing that our methods perform extremely well and are very effective in defending against malicious jamming attacks.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We prove that by using dynamic programming, both the sender's sensing and access algorithm and the receiver's receiving algorithm can be efficiently implemented with time and space complexities that are linear to n and k s (k r ). We prove it for the receiver side, and the proof for the sender side is the same.
In the proposed algorithm, steps 1 and 2 are time consuming since the total number of possible strategies is N = O(n k r ). In this proof, we show that the time complexity can be reduced by using dynamic programming. Let S(f,k) denote the strategy set in which each strategy choosesk channels from channelsf ,f + 1, . . . , n. We also useS(f ,k) to denote the strategy set in which each strategy choosesk channels from channels 1, 2, . . . ,f . We define W t (f ,k)= i∈S(f,k) f ∈i w f,t andW t (f ,k) = i∈S(f,k) f ∈i w f,t . Note W t (f ,k) = W t (f + 1,k) + wf ,t W t (f + 1,k − 1) and W t (f ,k) =W t (f − 1,k) + wf ,t W t (f − 1,k − 1), which implies that both W t (f,k) andW t (f ,k) can be computed in time O(k r n) (letting W t (f , 0) = 1, W (n + 1,k) =W (0,k) = 0) by dynamic programming for all 1 ≤f ≤ n and 1 ≤k ≤ k r .
In step 1, a strategy should be drawn from N strategies. Instead of drawing a strategy, we choose a channel one-by-one for the strategy. Assuming that we make a decision on each channel one by one in increasing order of their indexes, i.e., we first decide whether channel 1 should be chosen and channel 2, and so on. For any channel f , if k ≤ k r channels have been chosen among channels 1, . . . , f − 1, we choose channel f with probability (w f,t−1 W t−1 (f + 1, k r − k − 1))/(W t−1 (f, k r −k)), and we do not choose channel f with probability (W t−1 (f +1, k r − k))/(W t−1 (f, k r − k)). Let w(f ) = w f,t−1 if channel f is chosen in strategy i; 0 otherwise. w(f ) is the weight of f in the total weight of the strategy. In our algorithm, w i,t−1 = n f =1 w(f ). Let c(f ) = 1 if channel f is chosen in strategy i; 0 otherwise. f f =1 c(f ) denotes the number of channels chosen among channels 1, 2, . . . ,f in strategy i. In this implementation, the probability that a strategy i is chosen is The probability is exactly the same as that in Algorithm 1, which implies the correctness of this implementation.
Note that in this implementation, we do not maintain the total weight of each strategy w i,t . Hence, we cannot compute q f,t as we described in step 2 of our algorithm. The probability q f,t can be computed within O(n) as follows: q f,t = (1 − γ)(( 1 (1, k r ) )) + γ(|{i ∈ C : f ∈ i}|/|C|) for each round.
